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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
or trial court discretion, and such was the rule at common law. See Hayes v. Sear
Roebuck & Co., 34 Wn. 2d 666, 673, 209 P.2d 468, 472 (1949).
The instant case indicates that the trial court's assertion that the order is based
upon matters outside the record is not a sufficient reason under Rule 16, and even a
reference to the demeanor of witnesses, though admittedly not a consideration based
on the record is, in itself, too general.
That the result of the instant case is proper cannot be questioned, since as the opin-
ion points out, no particular significance was attached to the demeanor of any wit-
ness at the time the testimony was taken, and so the reasons in the trial court de-
cision which were not a part of the record seemed to come as an afterthought. How-
ever, a requirement that the trial judge specify with particularity the prejudicial effect
of such factors that are outside the record would seem to be an unreasonable encroach-
ment upon the sound discretion of the trial court.
RAYmoND H. Smmauus
Domestic Relations-Natural Guardianship in Grandparents. The superior court of
Washington for King County deprived the parents of X, a minor, of any and all par-
ental rights in or to the child and directed that he be a ward of the court. Y, the
maternal grandmother, petitioned for custody of the child. After complete and extend-
ed inquiry into Y's ability to care for the child the superior court (called the juvenile
court in this type of proceeding), denied the request for custody due primarily to Y's
tubercular condition. Held Reversed and remanded. When the parents were per-
manently deprived of custody the grandmother became the natural guardian and was
entitled to custody if she were found to be a proper person. The majority opinion
expressly states that the record presented supports the finding that the grandmother
was unfit. The case, however, is remanded for further proceedings because Y's claim
that the court below did not regard her as having a "preference right" to the child by
virtue of her natural guardianship and also due to her assertion that she would be
able to submit evidence of an improved physical condition. Four judges dissented.
State ex rel. Michelson v. Superior Court, 41 Wn.2d 718, 251 P.2d 603 (1952).
This case introduces into Washington the concept of natural guardianship passing
from the parents, upon death or permanent deprivation of their parental rights, to the
grandparents. The court declares that this is its first occasion to pass upon the legal
status of a blood relative of a child whose parents have either died or been per-
manently deprived of custody. It is true that this is the first case in Washington where-
in the court has had to deal directly with this contention. There are cases, which the
court in the instant case distinguished, in which language used suggested that grand-
parents have no legal right to custody of any child prior to an award of custody
to them by the court. See Morin v. Morin, 66 Wash. 312. 119 pac. 745 (1911) and In
re Stuart, 138 Wash.59, 244 Pac. 116 (1926).
The code provisions governing dependent and delinquent children and juvenile courts
would appear to be an obstacle to the result reached here. RCW 13.04 [RRS §1987]
governs juvenile courts and the awarding of custody of a "dependent child" as defined
(in the subsections pertinent here) by RCW 13.04.010 (5), (6), and (8) [RRS
§1987-1]. The code makes no mention of any rights residing in anyone to the custody
of a dependent child and seems to indicate that the juvenile court has discretion to
award custody of a dependent child to the person or institution it considers to be most
desireable for the welfare of the child. The Supreme Court agrees that the child in
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this case was a "dependent child" under the statute. Yet a right to custody stem-
ming from natural guardianship is recognized in the grandmother.
Aside from the technical argument that this is judicial legislation, the holding is
subject to attack because it creates problems which must be faced by juvenile courts
in future dealings with dependent children. The court expressly refused to decide
whether the grandparent was a "guardian" as that word is used throughout the statute,
or whether a grandparent not present was entitled to notice of custody proceedings
governing a dependent child. The majority expressly limits its holding to custody pro-
ceedings m which the grandparent voluntarily appears. In such situations, the ju-
venile court must consider the grandparent as possessing a right to custody if the
grandparent is a fit person.
This holding leaves many questions unanswered. Does the natural guardianship
relationship between the grandparents and the child involve the same consequences
as are attached to the natural guardianship relationship existing between the parents
and the child, i.e., would a change of domicile by the grandparents change the do-
micile of the child? Do the grandparents have a right to the earnings of the child?
Are the grandparents liable for support of the child? Are the grandparents, as natural
guardians, entitled to notice of adoption proceedings? Are the grandparents capable
of giving consent to the marriage of an underage child? If the only incident' of this
natural guardianship is a preference right to custody then it would appear that the ju-
venile court committed no error because the grandparent's ability to care for the child
was carefully considered.
The dissent points out other unresolved problems. When is this preference right to
custody terminated? One of the stated grounds for reversal was that the relator
claimed an ability to prove an improved physical condition. The question then re-
mains as to when the right to custody is finally ended. This question is crucial since
delay in determining the disposition of the child is particularly damaging to the child's
placement chances in adoptive homes because of the desire to adopt at the earliest
age. Another question is, how is this right terminated? A custody proceeding of which
the grandparents were not notified mighf not meet the due process requirements of the
federal constitution. The desire manifested by the supreme court that the juvenile cotirt
consider grandparents as natural guardians is not open to attack; but to remand a case
in which that very thing was done creates doubt as to the necessity of the doctrine
which is adopted. There would seem to be no need for insistence on this right since
juvenile courts are faced with a shortage of fit persons, related or not, seeking cus-
tody. The juvenile court was granted discretion in this area by the legislature and that
discretion. seems to have been abridged by this case.
JAcK . LOBDELL
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